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Summary 
An important question in public economics is to what extent changes in government funding 
lead to changes in private donations. In this chapter we identify and summarize four 
theoretical perspectives answering this question: the micro-economic, institutional-political, 
institutional signaling, and organizational perspective. Reviewing the empirical support for 
each perspective, we find that none of the perspectives sufficiently explains the dispersed 
empirical evidence for the relationship between government financial support and individual 
philanthropic donations. We argue that the context in which nonprofit organizations operate 
is a relevant but often overlooked factor that influences how government support affects 
philanthropic giving. Research in this area should adopt a dynamic perspective, taking into 
account the dynamics of different nonprofit revenue streams (from governments, businesses, 
foundations, households) as well as contextual level factors like the subsector of the nonprofit 
sector and country characteristics. 
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Introduction 
 
In public economics, a large body of literature has examined the question whether government 
funding “crowds out” private donations. There has been a vast number of empirical studies on 
this question, with dispersed and even contrasting findings. In this chapter we (1) give an 
overview of the most important theoretical perspectives on the relationship between 
government support and philanthropic giving; (2) evaluate the available evidence on these 
perspectives, and (3) identify the most promising directions for future research, taking into 
account the importance of the dynamics of funding portfolios and the contextual differences 
that influence these dynamics. We argue that it is not very useful to estimate “the” crowding-
out effect, because the association between government support and private giving varies 
strongly between contexts.  
A better understanding of the dynamics of different nonprofit revenue sources is crucial 
for the future of nonprofit organizations, given the importance of resources for organizational 
performance (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The size and composition of the revenue portfolio has 
important consequences for the financial health and governance of nonprofit organizations. 
Resources are necessary for nonprofit organizations to deliver goods and services that cannot 
be provided by the state or the market, to form a space where citizens express themselves, and 
to defend minority and animal rights in public debates. As such, the nonprofit sector plays a 
crucial role in today’s diverse societies. To increase organizational effectiveness of nonprofit 
organizations it is important to know, for both funders and recipients, how different revenue 
streams interact within different local contexts.  
In the next section, we first discuss the theoretical foundations of the literature studying 
the association between government support and private donations and the possible 
explanations for the mixed empirical support for the theoretical claims.  
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Theoretical perspectives 
 
Four perspectives dominate the literature. 
 
 
1. Micro-economic perspective 
 
Theory: A vast literature in economics examines how changes in government funding affect 
private individual donations. Economic theory predicts that altruistic donors reduce donations 
by one dollar for each dollar contributed through tax-funded government subsidies (Roberts, 
1984; Steinberg, 1991; Warr, 1982). Because the crowd-out was found to be less than dollar-
for-dollar, this theory was later refined by the addition of a “warm glow” component to the 
donors’ utility function, representing all motives that are not responsive to changing mandatory 
contributions (Andreoni, 1989, 1990).  
 
Key actors: Individual private donors. 
 
Empirical evidence: Experimental designs testing predictions of micro-economic theory 
typically provide participants with a small endowment that they can divide between themselves 
and the public good. When there is a larger mandatory contribution (“tax”) to the public good, 
participants generally give lower amounts as a voluntary donation. Such designs on average 
find that a $1 increase in mandatory contributions corresponds with a $0.64 decrease in 
voluntary contributions – this is fairly robust, with a 95% confidence interval around this 
average between -0.70 and -0.58 (De Wit & Bekkers, 2017). These results show that even in 
tightly controlled laboratory circumstances philanthropic donations cannot completely be 
substituted by a government tax or vice versa.  
Two limitations of the micro-economic theory are the following. 
 First, the theory and laboratory experiments testing it imply a number of assumptions, 
including full information on the actions of “the government”. These assumptions are not likely 
to be true in real life because donors know very little about the level of government funding 
nonprofit organizations receive (Eckel, Grossman, & Johnston, 2005; Horne, Johnson, & Van 
Slyke, 2005; De Wit, Bekkers, & Broese van Groenou, 2017). 
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Second, the theory uses the term “warm glow” as a catch-all phrase to refer to all impure 
altruistic motives, but it is unsure what motivations or mechanisms are included here. Giving 
for reasons of reputation or psychological benefits are just a few of the possible mechanisms 
that make donations unresponsive to government support. Donors may be insensitive to 
changes in government funding because of a habit, because giving sends a costly signal to 
potential partners, because giving is a social norm that implies a duty, or because not giving 
would create guilt (Vesterlund, 2006).  
 
Evaluation: In laboratory experiments there is strong evidence for impure altruism, but the 
external validity of such experiments is uncertain. This theoretical perspective does little to 
explain why donations would not be responsive to changes in government funding.  
 
 
2. Institutional-political perspective 
 
Theory: Weisbrod’s (1977) government failure theory posits that the government, while aiming 
to provide public goods that the market is not able to produce, is not equipped to fulfill all 
needs in society. Democratic governments are bound to the desires of the median voter, which 
leaves demands from different minorities unfulfilled. This is where nonprofit organizations 
step in, with their ability to provide a wide variety of public goods. Thus, where societies are 
more heterogeneous, government failure theory would predict a larger nonprofit sector and a 
smaller government.  
 Salamon & Anheier (1998) argue that the government failure theory is not sufficient to 
explain the mechanisms that are at work in different national contexts. Their social origins 
theory posits that social and political developments in the history of specific countries define 
current civil society sector dimensions: traditional, liberal, welfare-partnership, social-
democratic and statist. These dimensions reflect different power relationships between state, 
market and nonprofit sector in each country (Salamon, Sokolowski, & Haddock, 2017). 
 
Key actors: Nonprofit organizations, political parties, trade unions, and lobby groups.  
 
Empirical evidence: Analyses with data aggregated on the country, state or county level show 
mixed evidence for government failure theory. Some studies find a negative correlation 
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between government expenditures and the size of the nonprofit sector, as predicted by 
government failure theory (Matsunaga & Yamauchi, 2004; Matsunaga, Yamauchi, & 
Okuyama, 2010); other studies find positive correlations (Paarlberg & Zuhlke, 2019); and some 
studies find zero correlation (Gronbjerg & Paarlberg, 2001).  
The social origins theory as put forward by Salamon and Anheier has been widely cited 
but not often empirically scrutinized. Correlational analyses with aggregated data show to some 
extent support for the theoretical predictions based on the social origins theory (Einolf, 2015; 
Salamon, Sokolowski, & Haddock, 2017), but the longitudinal comparative data needed to test 
this theory does not exist.  
Two limitations of the institutional-political perspective are the following.  
First, the theoretical arguments are not universally applicable. Government failure 
theory requires a government that responds to the median voter and is thus most likely to occur 
in majority democracies (Sokolowski, 2013). Likewise, many countries do not fit in the five 
ideal types proposed in social origins theory. Einolf (2015: 518) concludes that “[e]ven for 
wealthy, democratic countries with a European culture and history, Salamon and Anheier’s 
social origins theory is of limited use”.  
Second, there is a lack of reliable quantitative data to test the hypotheses of these 
theories. Government failure theory is typically tested with proxy measures of heterogeneity, 
like ethnic or socio-economic diversity, which do not measure voter demands directly. 
Heterogeneity is not only a demand-side variable, but also related with social cohesion and 
other factors on the supply side (Corbin, 1999). Measures of philanthropy are problematic, too. 
Despite very useful attempts to collect all information that is currently available (Salamon & 
Anheier, 1998; Wiepking & Handy, 2015), there is a lack of reliable cross-national data on 
philanthropic giving, which makes comparative research problematic.  
 
Evaluation: Inconclusive. Historical political processes certainly contribute to the development 
of the nonprofit sector vis-à-vis the state, but the current data does not allow for strong 
conclusions about specific theoretical predictions. The strongest contribution of this 
perspective lies in the extensive analysis of country-specific political processes, rather than in 
quantitative testing of the theoretical expectations.  
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3. Institutional signaling perspective 
 
Theory: Institutional theories assume that attitudes and behaviors of citizens are shaped by 
formal (rules, legislation, organization) and informal (norms, habits) institutions (North, 1991; 
Rothstein, 1998). When in search for cues to guide their choices, people are guided by social 
rules (Ingram & Clay, 2000). Government support may serve as a signal that nonprofit 
organizations are trustworthy, which could explain a positive association between government 
funding and philanthropic donations (Handy, 2000; Heutel, 2014; Schiff, 1990). 
 
Key actors: Individual private donors. 
 
Empirical evidence: Theories on institutional signaling are typically tested with cross-national 
data, often finding positive correlations between government expenditure and civic 
engagement (Van Oorschot & Arts, 2005). For monetary giving, there is evidence that 
extensive social welfare spending does not reduce the total size of philanthropy, but rather 
shifts the causes they support, such that donors give more to “expressive” organizations (De 
Wit et al., 2018; Sokolowski, 2013; Pennerstorfer & Neumayr, 2017). Studies may also use 
more fine-grained datasets on specific charities. Heutel (2014) finds more strongly positive 
correlations between government funding and philanthropic donations among younger 
charities, for which the signaling effect would be stronger because they are less well-known 
among the public.   
A first limitation is the availability of data. Similar to the institutional-political 
perspective, research in the signaling literature mainly examines cross-national variety, 
because the largest differences between institutional arrangements are between countries. Yet, 
these studies are limited by the available cross-country datasets, which primarily cover WEIRD 
(Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic) countries.  
A second limitation in this perspective is the issue of causality. Welfare state institutions 
not only guide behavior through norms and signals, but also redistribute resources that 
encourage philanthropic giving (Stadelmann-Steffen, 2011; Van Ingen & Van der Meer, 2011). 
Furthermore, individual values, government expenditures and civic engagement can all be 
driven by the same underlying variables, and it is problematic to treat government spending as 
an exogenous variable (Payne, 2009). Insights from the institutional-political perspective can 
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be helpful in this sense, which pays more attention to the political processes that lead to the 
establishment of institutional arrangements in the public and non-profit spheres.  
 
Evaluation: Inconclusive. There are large differences between countries in terms of 
institutional arrangements and levels of philanthropy, but the causal mechanisms are difficult 
to disentangle. 
 
 
4. Organizational perspective 
 
Theory: Resource dependency theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) assumes that funders exercise 
control over nonprofit organizations. Nonprofit organizations can reduce their dependence by 
attracting resources from additional funders. Because efforts to do so require investment of 
resources, a self-sustaining feedback loop emerges that reduces chances of survival for 
organizations in a downward spiral, and makes winners even more successful. Such a 
“Matthew Effect” was described by Merton (1968) for careers of scientists – one grant leads to 
another.  
 Other scholars argued for an opposite effect, in which organizational behavior would 
explain a negative association between government support and private donations. As 
described in the “nonprofit starvation cycle” (Gregory & Howard, 2009), funders require low 
overhead costs, which gives pressure on nonprofit organizations to present themselves in that 
way, while performing with mediocre infrastructure. This leads again to unrealistic 
expectations at funders, and the cycle starts over again. In this argument, receiving government 
support could be detrimental for fundraising and administration expenditures that are necessary 
to obtain private income, because organizations are pressured to cut on their indirect costs.  
Andreoni & Payne (2003) argue that nonprofit organizations that receive lower 
government funding will invest more in fundraising behavior. Fundraising becomes less 
efficient, however, when individual giving is indeed crowded out by government support: if 
individual giving is lower, it is more costly to acquire funds. The result is incomplete crowding-
out. This process has been labeled “indirect crowding-out”.  
 
Key actors: fundraising organizations. 
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Empirical evidence: Andreoni & Payne (2003, 2011a, 2011b) find that charities in the United 
States and Canada increase fundraising efforts when confronted with lower government 
support. In Germany, however, Schubert & Boenigk (2019) show that declines of government 
funding start a “starvation cycle” in which organizations have increasing difficulties to acquire 
income.  
In terms of limitations, there is relatively little reliable data on organizational revenues 
in many countries, and more analyses can reveal how these mechanisms work in different 
national contexts and among different types of organizations. Another limitation might be that 
financial indicators are not always proper indicators of the proposed theoretical constructs, and 
there is ample room for discussion about the best way to measure constructs like liquidity, 
financial health and revenue diversification (e.g. Chikoto, Ling, & Neely, 2016; Prentice, 
2016). Also, analyses on financial statistics usually do not provide insights in decision-making 
processes within organizations. Research has examined the relationships between different 
types of revenue streams and nonprofits’ mission, autonomy, and degree of formalization 
(Froelich, 1999; O'Regan & Oster, 2002; Seo, 2016; Verschuere & De Corte, 2014). Because 
revenue portfolios are also driven by organizational characteristics and choices made by the 
receiving organizations, however, these relationships do not necessarily imply causal 
influences (Fischer, Wilsker, & Young, 2011).  
 
Evaluation: Organizational behavior is important for the association between government 
support and philanthropic giving. It is uncertain to what extent the proposed mechanisms work 
differently in different contexts and for different types of organizations. 
 
 
Towards a dynamic perspective 
 
To some extent, the divergence of findings in the empirical literature can be attributed to 
differences in the data and methods used. While it is clear that different research designs lead 
to different findings (Lu, 2016; De Wit & Bekkers, 2017), there is no consensus about the 
internal and external validity of such choices. In addition, there are substantial reasons why 
studies have reached such different conclusions. It has been argued that crowding-out effects 
vary with the level of government support (Borgonovi, 2006; Brooks, 2000, 2003), the salience 
of the tax (Eckel, Grossman, & Johnston, 2005), the number of other donors (Ribar & Wilhelm, 
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2002), differences between types and costs of public goods (Tinkelman, 2010), the number of 
people that do or do not contribute to a public good (Chan et al., 2002; Ribar & Wilhelm, 2002; 
Tinkelman, 2010), and the availability of information (De Wit, Bekkers, & Broese van 
Groenou, 2017). Some of these contextual differences may explain differences in the findings 
from between research designs as well. Laboratory experiments typically have a small number 
of other donors (Ribar & Wilhelm, 2002) and a salient message about the government 
contribution that is “taxed” from the participants (Eckel, Grossman, & Johnston, 2005). These 
conditions create a stronger crowding-out effect. In a large economy of donors, imperfect 
information about government support is likely to reduce the effect of changes in government 
funding on private giving.  
Different choices in data and methods, however, do not fully explain why crowding-
out effects look very different from the four perspectives. The four perspectives we have 
discussed also identify different actors as pivotal in the relationship between government 
funding and private giving. The four perspectives are not mutually exclusive. In reality, all 
actors involved probably all have their influences. These influence vary considerably between 
contexts – i.e., between “types”, cultures, countries, regions, and over time. Therefore, we 
argue it is not very useful to try to estimate “the” crowding-out effect. Different funding sources 
do not operate in a vacuum but are in constant interaction with other actors within and around 
the beneficiary organization. Therefore, theory and research on nonprofit revenues will benefit 
from adopting a dynamic perspective. Below we discuss two broad factors to consider in future 
research: interactions between different revenue streams, and the context in which these 
funding streams interact. 
 
The influence of other revenue streams 
A first reason why the effects of changes in government funding vary so strongly is that they 
interact with changes in other revenue streams. Compared to the sizeable literature on the 
effects of government funding on private donations, research on the interaction between 
funding from other sources, including households, foundations, businesses and governments, 
is rare. It is uncertain how these funding sources are related, and how these interactions affect 
outcomes such as organizational effectiveness. This is surprising, because different actors all 
contribute to the same goals and it is likely that they influence each other.  
On the one hand, revenues can substitute each other. From the institutional-political 
perspective we learn that country-specific political processes lead to a certain division of labor 
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between the state and the nonprofit sector. Non-governmental actors may step in where 
governments are not able to fulfill all demands, and this argument may be applicable to all 
types of private actors that contribute to those needs. Households, foundations and businesses 
may fill the gaps of the government and give money to organizations with lower levels of public 
funding. Philanthropic foundations are a special case because they are tax-exempt in many 
countries. While households and businesses may perceive government subsidies as something 
that they pay for with their taxes, foundations provide grants that are often completely 
independent from government subsidies. If there is substitution, it would be because other 
funding sources reduce the social needs in society. 
The government in its turn may decide to decrease subsidies to organizations that 
receive high levels of private funding. Previous studies showed that private giving crowds out 
government subsidies in US higher education (Becker & Lindsay, 1994; Sav, 2012), because 
increasing private donations affords politicians and bureaucrats “opportunities for reallocating 
tax supplied dollars away from education to other self-promoting and vote gathering pursuits” 
(Sav, 2012: 1133).  
Individual philanthropic donors may not only respond to levels of government support, 
but also to other types of funding. The theoretical rationale is largely similar to economic 
theories on government support and donations, with altruistic donors expected to reduce their 
contributions in the presence of other funding sources. Experimental evidence suggest that 
business funding crowds out individual donations (Bennett, Kim, & Loken, 2013). There is 
some literature on the idea that charitable lottery players donate less to philanthropic 
organizations, although evidence suggests that charitable gambling and donations are 
complements rather than substitutes (Apinunmahakul & Devlin, 2004; Lin, & Wu, 2007). It is 
likely that individual responses depend on how donors perceive the other funder. Business 
funding may be perceived as a signal of undesired corporate influences on nonprofit strategies, 
crowding-out private donations, while income from foundations or governments may be 
evaluated more positively, crowding-in donations (Khovrenkov, 2017). 
Organizational behavior may partly explain substitution effects between revenue 
streams. Insights from the organizational perspective are useful not only for the association 
between government support and private donations, but also for interactions between other 
types of funding.  
On the other hand, revenues may complement each other. Governments often work 
together with nonprofits, businesses and foundations in public-private partnerships (Ansell & 
Gash, 2008). In such collaborations, it is common that all partners contribute knowledge and/or 
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resources. With different types of contracts, including Social Impact Bonds, the initiators 
ensure the (conditional or unconditional) engagement of multiple public and private funders. 
For receiving organizations, this automatically leads to a diverse portfolio. This can be helpful 
to nonprofits in achieving its mission, although there are also some cautions for working with 
complex partnerships and having strong revenue diversification, largely dependent on the type 
of nonprofit organization (Hung and Hanger, 2019). 
Besides such organizational collaborations, it could be that funding streams 
complement each other in a less visible way. From the literature on institutional signaling we 
learn that funding from other sources can serve as a norm to direct individual behavior. This 
may not only hold for individual donors but also for businesses and foundations, who are 
looking for cues to guide their own financial decisions. Even policy makers, who are supposed 
to make robust decisions based on voter preferences, may have a bias towards organizations 
that are already successful in attracting funds.  
 The behaviors of the recipient organizations themselves may also produce positive 
correlations between revenue streams. Large and successful organizations may be better able 
to hire professional fundraisers, and establish and maintain connections with funders.  
 
The context in which nonprofit organizations operate 
Besides interactions between different revenue streams, the context in which nonprofits operate 
defines how government funding may affect philanthropic donations. Three factors are briefly 
mentioned here, which are more extensively discussed in De Wit (2018).  
 First, institutional arrangements on the macro level may affect the the dynamics 
between different revenue streams. An important hypothesis which is not sufficiently tested is 
that crowding-out is most likely in the United States and other Anglo-Saxon countries. These 
countries are characterized by a highly professionalized fundraising regime (Wiepking & 
Handy, 2015) and a more critical attitude towards government interventions (Andress & Heien, 
2001; Svallfors, 1997). More cross-national research in the realm of the institutional-political 
and institutional signaling perspective could examine how dynamics between nonprofit 
revenues vary across macro contexts.  
 Second, dynamics between nonprofit revenues may depend on the subsectors of the 
nonprofit sector. A meta-analysis finds stronger negative correlations between government 
funding and charitable giving among human service nonprofits, while it finds stronger positive 
correlations for the arts and health care sectors (Lu, 2016). Theoretical arguments about why 
12 
 
such effects would vary across the nonprofit sector are scarce. Each subsector is unique in the 
types of public goods that are produced, the actors that are most prominent, and the type of 
nonprofit organizations that are active in that area. Furthermore, those subsectors are not 
isolated: it has been argued that changing social needs do not decrease total donations, but 
rather leads donors to shift their donations towards other subsectors (De Wit et al., 2018; 
Pennerstorfer & Neumayr, 2017; Sokolowski, 2013). Research on the organizational level 
should consider such contextual dynamics when making generalizable statements about the 
association between government funding, philanthropic donations and other revenue streams. 
 The third contextual factor is the availability and framing of information. While 
behavioral experiments often aim to make predictions about macro effects, they generally fail 
to take the availability of information into account. Citizens adapt their giving behavior only 
when they are aware of external changes like changing government support. Although this 
sounds like “stating the obvious”, there has been surprisingly little academic attention for the 
availability of information among prospective donors (notable exceptions are De Wit, Bekkers, 
& Broese van Groenou, 2017; Horne, Johnson, & Van Slyke, 2005; Li & McDougle, 2017; 
McDougle & Handy, 2014). More experimental and non-experimental data on citizen 
perceptions and nonprofit communication could shed light on the role of information in donor 
decisions.  
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
In this chapter, we discussed the arguments, key actors and empirical evidence of four 
prominent theoretical perspectives on the relationship between government financial support 
and private individual giving. The micro-economic perspective convincingly revealed that 
individual donors are impure altruists in laboratory experiments, but it is uncertain to what 
extent this behavior occurs in daily situations. The institutional-political perspective 
contributed important insights in how interest groups contribute to constellations of public and 
non-profit institutions, and the institutional signaling perspective makes strong arguments 
about how institutions guide individual donor behavior. However, both institutional 
perspectives are not backed up with strong causal evidence. The organizational perspective, 
finally, delivers strong theoretical and empirical arguments on organizational behavior as a 
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cause and a consequence of changing revenues, although the proposed mechanisms will likely 
work differently in different contexts.  
 The theoretical discussion leads us to propose a dynamic approach towards nonprofit 
revenues. Supposed effects of government support on private donations do not occur in a 
vacuum but are shaped by contextual factors like the institutional environment, the 
organizational structure, the political context and the media landscape. Philanthropic 
foundations, individual donors, government bodies and corporate enterprises may all contribute 
to public goods, and they all interact with each other. Future research should go beyond 
estimations of “the” crowding-out effect, and pay more attention to the ecosystem in which 
such interactions take place. Such insights will help funders to better evaluate the value and 
consequences of their contributions, thus helping the nonprofit sector to continue contributing 
to essential public goods.  
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